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Assistant Director, R&E

21 September 1948

Chief, Global Survey Group

Coordination of ORE 60-48 with O.N.I.

Reference: DCI 3/2, "Policy Governing Departmental Concurrences in National Intelligence Reports and Estimates," 13 September 1948.

1. For your information, in case the subject should arise, and for any action you may deem appropriate, I wish to report that my experience in attempting to coordinate ORE 60-48 with ONI has been most unsatisfactory.

2. The problem to which ORE 60-48 is addressed was presented by Secretary Forrestal in NSC 20, 12 July 1948, and was declared by him to be a matter of first priority. Because, at his suggestion, it was referred initially to the Department of State, the NSC Staff request upon CIA for ORE 60-48 was not made until 23 August. The time lost during the interval rendered the project all the more urgent.

3. By memorandum, 25 August, the Chief, G/SI, informed the Departmental Agencies of the project and requested (1) that they designate representatives to consult with me and (2) that they be prepared to comment within 36 hours on a first draft which they would receive on about 1 September. ONI did not respond to this memorandum.

4. By memorandum, 3 September, the Chief, G/SI transmitted the first draft to the Departmental Agencies and renewed his request for the designation of representatives to consult with me with regard to it. (ONI received this communication on 7 September.) Captain Lange was subsequently designated as consultant for ONI.

5. At this juncture all intelligence agencies in Washington were particularly hard pressed, none more so than G-2 and OIR. These two, however, managed to afford consultation on our draft within 48 hours (on 9 September). A-2 did so on 13 September. On 10 September, however, Captain Lange advised me that ONI could not possibly act before 14 September, at the earliest, because one officer was engaged in auditing some accounts and another had gone to Norfolk to deliver an address. Lange's opinion then was that ONI would concur with minor editorial suggestions. He offered to send some such suggestions to me at once, but did not do so.

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6. On 15 September, under renewed pressure from the NSC Staff, having consulted with all agencies except ONI, considering that all references in the draft to naval capabilities had been taken from recent JIC papers presumably reflecting the ONI view, and considering Captain Lange's opinion, I submitted a revised draft to G/SI for final coordination by noon on 17 September.

7. My first opportunity for consultation with ONI occurred on 17 September (ten days' after ONI's receipt of the first draft with a request for consultation within 36 hours). I had then to discuss the final draft with Captain Habecker rather than Captain Lange. Habecker's demands upon me (it could hardly be otherwise described) fell under three heads:

- a. Amendments related to naval capabilities.
- b. Others related to ground force capabilities.
- c. Others related to the internal political situation of a certain country.

8. With respect to naval capabilities I of course accepted ONI's latest word, though with some objection to Habecker's rigid insistence on certain phraseology out of harmony with the context. The main trouble here resulted from an incidental explanatory reference to my necessary reliance, hitherto, on the somewhat different position taken by ONI in the JIC 435 series. This led to an acrimonious exchange precipitated by Captain Habecker's questioning, in an offensive manner, the veracity of my reference to the content of those papers. The subject is evidently a very sore one in ONI. I surmise that ONI nodded during the preparation of those papers, has been called to account for it by CNO, and is now under necessity to repudiate the position so recently taken. I do not care about that, but I do resent Captain Habecker's conduct in attempting to cover his own embarrassment by a personal attack on me. Nothing of the sort occurred, in similar circumstances, during my consultation with A-2.

9. With respect to ground force capabilities, I was able to satisfy Captain Habecker with a few verbal changes which neither altered the sense of the text nor improved its expression. These changes were inconvenient from an editorial and typographical point of view. I accepted them only as a lesser evil than a confusing ONI dissent which Habecker's rigid attitude foreshadowed.

10. I was, however, unable to accept Captain Habecker's contributions to political theory and terminology, which were either naive or merely quibbling. In this case his proposed changes would actually have distorted a text which was correctly phrased

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and had been concurred in by E/EE, OIR, G-2, and A-2. Their adoption would have deserved to incur the dissent of every other agency concerned. I am convinced that, while the naval and ground force issues raised by Habecker represented the views of Adm. Ingles, these political comments represent nothing more than a personal idiosyncrasy of Captain Habecker.

11. I am now informed that ONI will dissent with respect to the points of political terminology raised by Habecker. The actual dissent, however, had not been received by G/SI as late as 1000 on 21 September (seven days after ONI received the final text and four days after action was due). This was because Adm. Ingles was away, his deputy was swamped, and no one in ONI dared point out that action was overdue. At this point G/SI threatened to go to press without waiting longer for ONI action, and the dissent was immediately dispatched. It is evident that the Admiral's deputy must have signed the dissent without due consideration of its content.

12. Although the ONI dissent is not yet available, I submit that any based on Habecker's contention must be not only ill-founded, but mere captious quibbling with respect to a subject outside the special competence of ONI. It could not amount to a substantial dissent within the true intent and meaning of NSCID No. 3 and DCI 3/2, para. 5.

13. With respect to the general problem, I wish to emphasize that no such difficulties arose during my coordination with OIR, G-2, and A-2. It is true that A-2 was not as prompt as OIR and G-2, but I expect that to be remedied as a result of a cordial and constructive conference which I had with Gen. Cabell yesterday. The residual problem pertains exclusively to ONI.

14. This and similar experiences with ONI seem to reveal:

a. A cavalier disregard of our requests for cooperation, in turn revealing a failure to appreciate that these requests are not made for our own satisfaction, but in order to meet the requirements of the National Security Council, and that our work for the Council is of some importance and urgency.

b. A scant appreciation of the professional competence of CIA personnel; a tendency to quibble over terminology and a rigid insistence upon submission to the lay opinion and personal idiosyncrasies of naval officers in matters outside the particular competence of ONI.

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e. A failure to understand the function of OMI within the terms of NSCID No. 3 and DCI 3/2.

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cc: AD/ORE  
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